

THE ROLE OF THE MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST IN IMPROVING AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY

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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.46491/jp.v19i4.1877>

Abstract

The Minimum Equipment List (MEL) is an operator-specific document that establishes the conditions under which an aircraft may temporarily operate with specified instruments, equipment, or systems inoperative. Its implementation is intended to maintain an acceptable level of aviation safety while supporting operational continuity and effective aircraft maintenance planning. This study analyzes the role of MEL in improving aircraft operational safety and efficiency, its contribution to aircraft dispatch and maintenance decision-making, and the implementation challenges identified in aviation regulations and previous studies. A narrative literature review was conducted using international aviation regulations and peer-reviewed studies related to MEL, aircraft maintenance, continuing airworthiness, operational reliability, and aviation safety. The reviewed literature indicates that MEL provides a structured reference for evaluating technical defects, determining dispatch eligibility, applying maintenance and operational procedures, and controlling defect-rectification intervals. Proper implementation may reduce unnecessary aircraft grounding, delays, cancellations, aircraft substitutions, and unplanned maintenance. However, MEL effectiveness depends on regulatory compliance, personnel competence, accurate technical documentation, interdepartmental coordination, and continuous monitoring of deferred defects. MEL should therefore be understood as an integral component of continuing airworthiness, maintenance management, and aviation safety management.

Keywords : Minimum Equipment List, aviation safety, operational efficiency, aircraft maintenance, continuing airworthiness



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INTRODUCTION

Safety, airworthiness, and operational efficiency are fundamental requirements in commercial aviation. Modern aircraft consist of interconnected mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, electronic, communication, navigation, and flight-control systems. A malfunction in one component may affect aircraft dispatch, maintenance planning, flight schedules, operating costs, and, under certain

circumstances, flight safety. Nevertheless, not every malfunction automatically renders an aircraft unsafe or unairworthy. Specified instruments, systems, or items of equipment may temporarily remain inoperative when an aircraft is operated under limitations and procedures established through an approved Minimum Equipment List (MEL) (International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO], 2022; Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2023). The MEL is an operator-specific document developed from the applicable Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) for a particular aircraft type. It identifies instruments, equipment, or systems that may temporarily be inoperative while maintaining an acceptable level of safety. The document normally specifies the number of items installed, the minimum number required for dispatch, rectification categories, maintenance procedures, operational procedures, placarding requirements, and applicable limitations (European Union Aviation Safety Agency [EASA], 2025; FAA, 2023).

ICAO requires an aircraft operator to establish an MEL approved by the State of the Operator. The MEL assists the pilot-in-command in determining whether a flight may be commenced or continued when an aircraft instrument, system, or item of equipment becomes inoperative. The operator's MEL must be based on the applicable MMEL while reflecting the aircraft configuration, operating environment, routes, maintenance capability, and national regulatory requirements (ICAO, 2022). Therefore, MEL must not be interpreted as a general authorization to operate an aircraft with any malfunctioning equipment. MEL implementation represents a structured approach to operational risk management. When equipment becomes inoperative, pilots, aircraft technicians, maintenance-control personnel, and flight dispatchers must identify the applicable MEL item and ensure that all required conditions are fulfilled. These conditions may include conducting inspections, disabling components, applying placards, modifying operational procedures, restricting flight under specified conditions, or completing corrective maintenance within a prescribed rectification interval (FAA, 2023; EASA, 2025).

In addition to supporting safety, MEL contributes to operational continuity. Without an approved MEL, a relatively minor defect may result in aircraft grounding, delays, cancellations, aircraft substitution, and additional passenger-handling costs. When an affected item is permitted to be inoperative and all associated requirements are fulfilled, an aircraft may temporarily continue operating while permanent maintenance is appropriately scheduled. MEL

therefore enables operators to balance aircraft availability with continuing-airworthiness requirements (Obadimu et al., 2020; Lee & Mitici, 2022). However, MEL does not eliminate the obligation to repair defective equipment. Deferred defects must be documented, monitored, and rectified within the applicable period. Repeated defect deferral, incomplete maintenance procedures, inaccurate technical-log entries, or failure to consider interactions among multiple inoperative items may create additional risks. MEL effectiveness consequently depends on technical requirements, personnel competence, communication, organizational supervision, safety culture, and regulatory compliance (Clare & Kourousis, 2021; Mendes et al., 2022).

Aircraft-maintenance studies indicate that aviation occurrences may involve procedural deviations, inadequate inspections, communication failures, time pressure, insufficient supervision, and organizational weaknesses. Technical procedures alone therefore cannot guarantee safety. They must be supported by competent personnel, recurrent training, effective coordination, and organizational systems that ensure consistent implementation (Habib & Turkoglu, 2020; Insley & Turkoglu, 2020; Wild, 2023). Obadimu et al. (2020) identified differences in MEL development and implementation practices and emphasized the need for improved standardization. Their study also indicated that inadequate guidance, insufficient training, and limited airworthiness experience may contribute to MEL misinterpretation or mismanagement. MEL should therefore be examined not only as a technical document but also as a socio-technical instrument involving regulators, aircraft manufacturers, airlines, maintenance organizations, pilots, technicians, dispatchers, and operational-control personnel.

Previous studies have examined MEL development, maintenance safety, continuing airworthiness, operational reliability, and aviation risk management. However, relatively few studies have integrated these perspectives to explain how MEL simultaneously supports safety, aircraft availability, maintenance planning, human-factor management, and operational efficiency. This review addresses that gap by synthesizing regulatory documents and peer-reviewed studies related to MEL implementation. Accordingly, this study aims to:

1. analyze the role of MEL in aircraft operational safety;
2. examine its contribution to aircraft availability and operational efficiency;
3. identify human and organizational factors influencing its implementation;
4. examine regulatory and operational challenges; and

5. formulate practical recommendations for airlines and aircraft maintenance organizations.

METHODS

This study employed a narrative literature review supported by document analysis to examine the role of the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) in aircraft operational safety, continuing airworthiness, maintenance planning, and operational efficiency. This approach was selected because it enables the integration of regulatory documents, conceptual discussions, and findings from previous studies related to aviation maintenance and safety (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Patton, 2015).

The reviewed sources consisted of official documents issued by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), as well as peer-reviewed studies related to MEL implementation, aircraft maintenance, continuing airworthiness, operational reliability, and aviation risk management. Document analysis was used to identify regulatory requirements, operational limitations, maintenance procedures, rectification intervals, and safety considerations (Bowen, 2009).

The literature search used keywords including “Minimum Equipment List,” “Master Minimum Equipment List,” “MEL implementation,” “aircraft dispatch,” “continuing airworthiness,” “aircraft maintenance safety,” “deferred defects,” and “operational efficiency.” Sources were included when they directly addressed MEL, MMEL, aircraft operations with inoperative equipment, maintenance safety, or operational reliability. Sources without identifiable authorship, verifiable publication information, or direct relevance to the research objectives were excluded.

The selected sources were analyzed thematically through data familiarization, coding, identification of recurring concepts, and development of major themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Nowell et al., 2017). Information from regulatory documents was compared with findings from peer-reviewed studies to strengthen the interpretation and reduce reliance on a single source (Denzin, 2012; Patton, 2015). The analytical process was systematically documented to support the credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transparency of the review (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Nowell et al., 2017)

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Minimum Equipment List (MEL) provides guidance on which aircraft equipment must remain operative and which items may temporarily be inoperative under specified maintenance and operational conditions. The international MEL framework is established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), with further regulatory guidance provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) (ICAO, 2022; FAA, 2023; EASA, 2025). Each aircraft operator must develop an operator-specific MEL based on the applicable Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL), aircraft configuration, operating environment, and maintenance capability. The MEL must also be approved by the competent aviation authority before it is used in aircraft operations (FAA, 2023; EASA, 2025).

Proper MEL implementation supports aircraft airworthiness, operational safety, and continuity. An aircraft may be dispatched with inoperative equipment only when the condition is permitted by the approved MEL and all applicable maintenance procedures, operational procedures, placarding requirements, inspections, and rectification intervals have been fulfilled (Obadimu et al., 2020; FAA, 2023). MEL may therefore reduce unnecessary aircraft grounding, flight delays, cancellations, aircraft substitutions, and unplanned maintenance activities while maintaining the required level of safety (Obadimu et al., 2020; EASA, 2025).

Effective MEL implementation also depends on personnel competence and coordination. Pilots, aircraft technicians, engineers, and dispatchers must understand the applicable operational limitations, maintenance actions, rectification requirements, and interactions among inoperative systems. Inadequate training, limited airworthiness knowledge, incorrect interpretation, time pressure, incomplete technical-log entries, communication failures, and inappropriate defect deferral may result in MEL mismanagement or misapplication (Obadimu et al., 2020). Therefore, recurrent training, effective communication, accurate documentation, and coordination between flight crews and maintenance personnel are essential for improving aviation safety, aircraft availability, maintenance effectiveness, and operational efficiency.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1. MEL and Aircraft Operational Safety

The reviewed literature shows that the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) provides a structured basis for determining whether an aircraft with specified inoperative equipment may continue operating under approved conditions. Aircraft dispatch is permitted only when the applicable MEL item has been identified and all maintenance procedures, operational procedures, limitations, placarding requirements, and rectification intervals have been fulfilled (ICAO, 2022; FAA, 2023; EASA, 2025).

MEL supports consistent and traceable decision-making among pilots, aircraft technicians, maintenance-control personnel, and flight dispatchers (FAA, 2023). However, its safety contribution depends on correct interpretation, competent personnel, effective supervision, and regulatory compliance. Incorrect MEL application may result in inappropriate dispatch decisions (Obadimu et al., 2020). Maintenance-related research also shows that procedural deviations, communication failures, inspection errors, and organizational weaknesses may contribute to aviation accidents and serious incidents (Habib & Turkoglu, 2020; Insley & Turkoglu, 2020; Wild, 2023). Therefore, MEL should be integrated into continuing-airworthiness, quality-assurance, and aviation-safety-management systems.

2. Operational Efficiency and Aircraft Availability

MEL provides operational flexibility by allowing an aircraft to remain temporarily in service when specified equipment is permitted to be inoperative. Without an approved MEL, even a non-critical defect may cause aircraft grounding, delays, cancellations, or aircraft substitution. MEL enables controlled operation while permanent maintenance is appropriately scheduled (Obadimu et al., 2020; EASA, 2025).

Nevertheless, dispatch remains permissible only when all MEL conditions have been fulfilled. Weather, routes, aerodrome facilities, flight duration, aircraft configuration, and other inoperative items must also be considered (FAA, 2023). Thus, MEL is not merely a mechanism for preventing delays but a regulated instrument for balancing operational continuity with continuing-airworthiness requirements.

3. Maintenance Planning and Operating Costs

Proper MEL implementation may improve maintenance planning by allowing deferred defects to be rectified when authorized personnel, spare parts, tools, and facilities are available. This arrangement may reduce unnecessary unscheduled maintenance and improve the allocation of technical resources.

MEL may also reduce costs associated with unnecessary grounding, cancellations, aircraft substitutions, passenger disruption, and emergency maintenance. However, no universal percentage of savings can be attributed to MEL because the financial effect depends on aircraft type, fleet size, route structure, maintenance capability, defect characteristics, and operating conditions.

Lee and Mitici (2022) emphasize that maintenance planning requires a balance between reliability and cost efficiency. MEL supports this balance by allowing controlled temporary operation while maintaining clear rectification obligations. Repetitive defects, repeated use of the same MEL item, and rectification extensions should therefore be monitored because they may indicate component-reliability problems, insufficient spare parts, weak maintenance planning, or operational pressure.

4. Relationship between MMEL and MEL

The Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) is developed for a particular aircraft type and provides the technical basis for preparing an operator-specific MEL. The MEL must reflect the aircraft configuration, operating routes, environmental conditions, maintenance capability, types of operation, and applicable national regulations (EASA, 2025; Obadimu et al., 2020).

An MEL may be more restrictive than the applicable MMEL but should not be less restrictive without authorization from the competent aviation authority. This is important because the same aircraft type may operate under different routes, climates, aerodrome facilities, and maintenance-support conditions. Therefore, an MEL approved for one operator cannot automatically be applied by another operator.

The MEL normally contains the affected item or system, the number installed, the minimum number required for dispatch, rectification category, maintenance procedures, operational procedures, placarding requirements, and

applicable limitations. All associated requirements must be fulfilled before aircraft dispatch (FAA, 2023; EASA, 2025).

5. Regulatory Framework

ICAO establishes the international regulatory foundation for MEL implementation through Annex 6. Operators are required to establish an approved MEL that assists the pilot-in-command in determining whether a flight may commence or continue when equipment becomes inoperative (ICAO, 2022).

The FAA provides detailed guidance concerning MEL development, approval, operational and maintenance procedures, documentation, placarding, rectification intervals, and deferred-defect control (FAA, 2023). EASA also provides certification specifications and guidance for MMEL development and the safety assessment of inoperative equipment (EASA, 2025).

These regulatory frameworks demonstrate that MEL is not merely an internal airline document. Its development and use require regulatory approval, technical evaluation, controlled procedures, and continuous organizational oversight.

6. MEL as an Operational Risk-Management Tool

MEL supports operational risk management through defect identification, correct MEL-item selection, completion of required maintenance actions, application of operational limitations, technical-log documentation, and rectification monitoring (FAA, 2023). This structured process may reduce inconsistent dispatch decisions and human error.

Particular attention is required when several items are simultaneously inoperative because their combined effects may create additional risks. Mendes et al. (2022) explain that aviation-maintenance risk management applies proactive, predictive, and interactive approaches. In MEL implementation, these approaches may include recurrent training, technical-log audits, rectification monitoring, repetitive-defect analysis, equipment-reliability monitoring, and coordination among pilots, technicians, engineers, dispatchers, maintenance-control personnel, and safety managers.

MEL-related information should therefore be integrated into aircraft reliability programmes and Safety Management Systems. Repeated MEL use,

overdue rectification, documentation errors, and procedural deviations may help organizations identify emerging technical and organizational risks.

7. Human and Organizational Factors

MEL effectiveness is influenced by personnel competence, communication, supervision, and safety culture. Personnel must understand the distinction between MMEL and MEL, rectification categories, maintenance procedures, operational procedures, documentation requirements, and possible interactions among multiple inoperative items.

Obadimu et al. (2020) identified inadequate guidance, insufficient training, and limited airworthiness experience as factors that may contribute to MEL misinterpretation or mismanagement. Recurrent training should therefore be provided to pilots, aircraft technicians, dispatchers, maintenance-control personnel, engineers, and operational managers.

Communication is also essential. Pilots must accurately record defects in the aircraft technical log, while maintenance personnel must clearly communicate required actions, limitations, placarding requirements, and rectification deadlines. Communication failures, procedural deviations, inadequate inspections, time pressure, and organizational weaknesses may contribute to maintenance-related occurrences (Habib & Turkoglu, 2020; Insley & Turkoglu, 2020; Wild, 2023). Clare and Kourousis (2021) further emphasize that MEL-related errors and repeated defects should be used as opportunities for organizational learning.

8. Implementation Challenges and Practical Implications

The main challenges in MEL implementation include differences in personnel knowledge, incomplete technical-log entries, documentation errors, operational pressure, repeated defect deferral, and interactions among multiple inoperative items. Differences among regulatory jurisdictions, aircraft configurations, routes, and maintenance capabilities may also complicate the standardization of MEL practices (Obadimu et al., 2020).

Airlines should strengthen recurrent training, technical-log audits, deferred-defect monitoring, rectification-interval control, and repetitive-defect analysis. Maintenance organizations must ensure that all MEL procedures are completed by authorized personnel and accurately recorded. Pilots and dispatchers should

consider weather, routes, destination and alternate aerodromes, available facilities, aircraft configuration, and other inoperative items before dispatch.

Regulatory authorities should assess both the availability and actual implementation of an approved MEL. Aviation training institutions should also use scenario-based learning to improve competence in defect reporting, MEL-item identification, rectification categories, technical documentation, and coordination between flight-operation and maintenance personnel.

CONCLUSION

This narrative review concludes that the Minimum Equipment List plays an essential role in aircraft operational safety, continuing airworthiness, and operational efficiency. MEL provides an approved basis for determining whether an aircraft with specified inoperative equipment may temporarily remain in service. Its use requires compliance with maintenance procedures, operational procedures, limitations, placarding, technical documentation, and rectification intervals. Proper implementation can support aircraft availability, maintenance planning, and reduction of avoidable grounding, delays, cancellations, substitutions, and unplanned maintenance. Nevertheless, these benefits must remain subordinate to safety and airworthiness. MEL must not be used to postpone maintenance indefinitely because every deferred defect must be documented, monitored, and rectified.

MEL effectiveness depends on personnel competence, recurrent training, accurate technical-log entries, communication, regulatory compliance, organizational supervision, and coordination between flight-operation and maintenance personnel. Inadequate interpretation, operational pressure, repeated deferral, incomplete procedures, and multiple inoperative items may create additional risks. Airlines and maintenance organizations should strengthen MEL management through training, deferred-defect monitoring, technical-log audits, rectification control, repetitive-defect analysis, and integration with reliability programmes and Safety Management Systems. Regulators should evaluate both MEL content and implementation, while training institutions should apply scenario-based learning. This review is limited by its narrative design, the limited number of MEL-specific studies, and differences among regulatory jurisdictions, aircraft types, operations, and maintenance capabilities. Future studies should use

verified operational data to examine MEL implementation, aircraft downtime, dispatch reliability, defect recurrence, maintenance costs, delays, and aviation safety performance.

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